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When a Landmark Cannot Serve as a Trademark:
Trademark Protection for Building Designs in Light of
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v.
Gentile Productions
Andrew T. Spence*
For many years the law has recognized the availability of
buildings to serve as trademarks. A federally registered trademark
exists for the art deco spire of the Chrysler Building and the
neoclassical facade of the New York Stock Exchange.1 In fact,
approximately one hundred buildings have federally registered
trademarks.2 However, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rock and Roll
Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions narrowed the
scope of protection that such trademarks enjoy.3 In a 1998 split
decision, the court reversed a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement suit between the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and
Museum and Charles Gentile, a professional photographer.
Traditional trademark law suits involving building designs deal
with potential infringers creating similar building designs. The Rock
and Roll Hall of Fame case differs because it involves protection of a
building design depicted on Museum merchandise and a competing
poster embodying a photograph of the design.
Part II of this Note examines a brief history of trademark law in
the United States and the fundamentals of trademark protection. Part
* J.D. Candidate 2000. I would like to thank my parents, Jim and Linda Spence, for
their input and support during the writing of this Note.
1. David W. Dunlap, Who Owns N.Y. Skyline? Check the Fine Print, 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), Sept. 1, 1998, at 20. The art deco
spire of the Chrysler Building may be found as federal trademark number 1126888, and the
façade of the New York Stock Exchange may similarly be found as number 1761655. Id.
2. Tara J. Goldsmith, Comment, What’s Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act
Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 831 n.49
(1997).
3. Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum v. Gentile Productions, 134 F.3d 749 (6th
Cir. 1998).
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III discusses how trademark law applies to buildings and building
designs. This part also briefly comments on the protection of building
designs under copyright law and its limitations. Part IV examines the
facts of Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and the court’s analysis. Part V
critiques the conflicting positions of the majority and the dissent.
Finally, part VI concludes that the majority’s confused discussion
came to the right conclusion; however, it did so through unpersuasive
analysis.
II. TRADEMARK GENERALLY
Generally, a symbol acts as a trademark when the merchant of one
particular good uses the mark to distinguish his goods from those of
other merchants.4 The exclusive right in a trademark is founded upon
“priority of appropriation.”5 This foundation establishes that
trademark protection belongs to the first user to appropriate the mark
in commerce, not to the first user to adopt the mark.6 One of the
functions of a trademark is to allow the user to distinguish his
products from those of subsequent would-be users.7 As such,
4. Broadly speaking, a trademark means “a distinctive mark of authenticity, through
which the products of particular manufacturers or the vendible commodities of particular
merchants may be distinguished from those of others.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1493 (6th
ed. 1990). Similar species of marks used in commerce to distinguish one merchant from another
include “service marks,” “collective marks,” and “certification marks.” JEROME GILSON,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.02(1)(b) (1999). The most widely used mark of
these other species, the service mark, differs from the trademark in that trademarks apply to
marks used on “goods,” while service marks apply to marks used in connection with “services.”
Id.
5. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
6. See id.
7. A trademark functions and is accorded legal protection because it:
(a) designates the source or origin of a particular product or service, even though
the source is to the customer anonymous;
(b) denotes a particular standard of quality which is embodied in the product or
service;
(c) identifies a product or service and distinguishes it from the products or services
of others;
(d) symbolizes the good will of its owner and motivates consumers to purchase the
trademarked product or service;
(e) represents a substantial advertising investment and is treated as a species of
property; or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/17
223.doc 08/24/00
2000]     When a Landmark Cannot Serve as a Trademark 519
trademark law operates as one aspect of the broader common law of
unfair competition.8 The law of unfair competition derives from
public policy notions that a competitor should not benefit in
commerce from another’s goodwill.9 Additionally, the law recognizes
that the public should be protected from such deceitful business
practices.10
Trademark law in the United States consisted of common law and
state statutes until Congress passed the first federal trademark statute
in 1870.11 The Supreme Court found the Act, which claimed
protection for trademarks under the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the Constitution,12 unconstitutional.13 The Court held the protection
afforded trademarks under the Act to be too broad for the authority
granted under the Patent and Copyright Clause.14 In 1881 Congress
reenacted federal trademark legislation,15 basing the statute on the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.16 Since adoption of the 1881
legislation, federal trademark legislation evolved through significant
changes,17 culminating with the Lanham Act.18
(f) protects the public from confusion and deception, insures that consumers are
able to purchase the products and services they want, and enables the courts to
fashion a standard of acceptable business conduct.
GILSON, supra note 4, § 1.03(1).
8. See id. § 1.04(2). Loosely, unfair competition applies to all dishonest or fraudulent
rivalry in commerce, particularly to the practice of seeking to substitute one’s own products in
the markets for those of another. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1062.
9. Goodwill pertains to “[t]he favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to
goods or services known to emanate from a particular source.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 4, at 694.
10. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 1.04(2).
11. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1890).
12. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82.
14. The exclusive right in trademark “is simply founded on priority of appropriation. We
look in vain in the statute for any other qualification or condition.” 100 U.S. at 94. Also,
trademark’s exclusive right, the Court found, does not depend on “novelty, discovery, or any
work of the brain.” 100 U.S. at 94.
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881).
16. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (1905); Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104,
41 Stat. 533 (1920).
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Creating and protecting a valid trademark under federal law
requires the satisfaction of a series of requirements. Initially, the first
user of the mark must establish his exclusive right to the mark. This
requires careful selection of a mark that is nonfunctional19 and
distinctive enough to serve as a trademark. The first user of the mark
must then appropriate the mark in commerce.20 Once the first user
establishes his exclusive right to the mark, to protect the mark from
subsequent users, the first user must show that his use and another’s
subsequent use are likely to confuse the consumer regarding the
origin of the products associated with the mark.21
Under federal law, before one can protect a mark as a trademark,
the user must establish his exclusive right in the mark. First, to
establish a trademark right, a mark must be distinctive and
distinguish the user’s goods from other’s goods.22 Generally, courts
group marks into one of four classifications of increasing
distinctiveness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or
fanciful.23 Marks that are merely generic, referring only to “the genus
of which the particular product is a species,” cannot become valid
trademarks.24 Even descriptive marks can only become valid
trademarks upon acquiring a secondary meaning.25 However, courts
deem suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful marks as inherently
distinctive; thus, they are protectable upon first use or intended use.26
This categorization exists because the mark’s inherent nature serves
to identify the particular source of a product.27 By definition these
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998).
19. See infra note 30.
20. See supra note 14.
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125. 
22. It is important to note that goods can be distinctive and not serve a product
distinguishing purpose. A court will not afford trademark protection to a design or pattern that
the public sees merely as ornamentation instead of a distinguishing mark. See GILSON, supra
note 4, § 2.01.
23. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 9.
25. See id. at 10. Secondary meaning refers to a mark’s use in commerce by the user such
that it has, by use, become distinctive of the user’s goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1998).
26. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). The
protectability upon first use of such marks derives from their validity as trademarks and the
acquisition of the right through appropriation. See id.; see also supra note 14.
27. 505 U.S. at 768.
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marks are entitled to protection as a valid trademark.28 Thus, a mark
will meet the initial requirements for protection as a trademark if it is
either inherently distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning.29
A second requirement, or limitation, on the protectability of a
mark as a trademark is functionality.30 To be eligible for protection as
a trademark, a mark must be nonfunctional.31 The doctrine of
functionality developed from common law.32 While the doctrine
applies to all marks protected under unfair competition, it applies
more readily to situations relating to trade dress33 than to traditional
trademark.34 Although dealing with the issue of state law preemption,
the landmark cases Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.35 and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.36 illustrate one principal policy
behind the functionality requirement in both federal and state
28. See id.
29. See id. at 769.
30. A mark can be deemed functional if its superiority over all other alternatives would
hinder competition if the first user had exclusive rights over its use. See BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 673. Courts have also interpreted the doctrine of functionality to
apply to some marks on products that serve a primarily aesthetic purpose. This aesthetic
functionality includes elements of a product that primarily add to the aesthetic appeal of the
product and its value, instead of designating the source of the product. GILSON, supra note 4,
§ 7.02(7) n.143 (discussing the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals approach to deciding
functionality).
31. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 7.02(7)(f) n.143.
32. See id. § 7.02(f).
33. Trade dress relates to the total appearance and image a product or product
configuration— including such features as size, texture, shape, and color. BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1493.
34. This is because trademarks traditionally deal with words and symbols. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (definition of trademark). See also GILSON, supra note 4, § 7.02(7)(f).
35. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). The plaintiffs in Sears had acquired design and mechanical
patents in a “pole lamp” design. Id. When the defendant began to sell a nearly identical lamp
design, the plaintiffs brought action for infringement of their patent. Id. at 226. The plaintiffs
also sought relief for unfair competition under state common law, citing consumer confusion as
to the source of the competing lamps. Id. The district court found the design patent invalid for
lack of invention but found the defendant guilty of unfair competition. Id. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Id. at 227. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the state unfair competition law
preempted by the Supremacy Clause with respect to unpatented articles. Id. at 231.
36. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The plaintiff in Compco had acquired a design patent on a
fluorescent lighting fixture. Id. As in Sears, the defendant began to sell a similar design as that
of the plaintiff’s lighting fixture. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant based on
theories of patent infringement and unfair competition. Id. at 235. Also as in Sears, the district
court held the plaintiff’s design patent invalid but found the defendant guilty of unfair
competition, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 235-36. The Supreme Court reversed,
citing Sears as authority. Id. at 237.
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trademark law. In Sears and Compco the Supreme Court held that
federal patent law preempted state laws that protected unpatented
product designs from being copied, because such laws are contrary to
the policy behind the federal laws.37 Under current federal unfair
competition law, the functionality requirement exists in the Lanham
Act.38
While the courts will not protect a purely functional mark as a
trademark, they also will not deny protection to every mark that can
serve a functional purpose. In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,
Inc.,39 the Supreme Court addressed the boundaries for qualification
as a valid trademark. Noting that the Lanham Act defines a trademark
to “include[] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof,” the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, stating that
the plain language of the Lanham Act is not restrictive.40 The Court
held that the doctrine of functionality will not bar a mark from
serving as a trademark in certain cases.41 If the functional mark is not
essential to the product’s use and does not affect its cost or quality,
37. The Supreme Court in Sears stated that allowing state unfair competition law to
prevent the copying of an unpatentable article would allow states to remove from the public
domain an article that federal law determined to be within it. 376 U.S. at 231-32. See Compco,
376 U.S. at 237 (“To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in [federal
patent law], of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain.”); GILSON, supra note 4, § 2.14(1).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1998). The federal unfair competition statute, contained within
the Lanham Act, produces an alternative cause of action, aside from trademark infringement.
While § 32 of the Lanham Act provides a cause of action for trademark infringement of
federally registered trademarks, § 43(a) provides broader protection for marks regardless of
federal trademark registration. Id. §§ 1114, 1125. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 7.01(4).
39. 514 U.S. 159 (1995). In Qualitex the plaintiff used a shade of green-gold color on
pads it sold for dry cleaning presses. Id. at 161. When the defendant then began to sell the same
type of pads with the same green-gold color, the plaintiff filed an unfair competition claim. Id.
Subsequent to filing the unfair competition claim, the plaintiff obtained a federal trademark
registration on the color of its pads and added a trademark infringement claim to its suit against
the defendant. Id. The plaintiff won the suit in the District Court, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, stating that federal trademark law does not permit the registration of a
trademark consisting of color alone. Id.
40. 514 U.S. at 162. “Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language [of the Lanham Act], read
literally, is not restrictive.” Id.
41. See 514 U.S. at 165. The Court found that a product’s color is unlike marks which are
“fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive,” but if that color has acquired a secondary meaning
which identifies a particular source, there would be no theoretical objection to the basic
objectives of trademark law. Id. at 162-63.
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then a trademark may exist.42
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of functionality in WSM,
Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co.43 and Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche
Automobile Corse v. Roberts.44 WSM involved the sale of T-shirts
bearing design transfers of similar marks. The defendant in the WSM
case asserted the doctrine of functionality stating that its use of a T-
shirt design was purely functional, and thus incapable of trademark
protection.45 Upholding the plaintiff’s trademark, the court stated that
just because a mark serves a function, that does not preclude it from
serving to identify the source of the product, if other aspects of the
mark are nonfunctional.46
Ferrari involved the issue of whether the plaintiff could protect
the exterior shape and appearance of its automobiles.47 The defendant
asserted the aesthetic functionality doctrine precluded trademark
protection of the plaintiff’s automobile exterior shape.48 The court
upheld the trademark, stating that aesthetic functionality will not
preclude a finding of nonfunctionality for trademark purposes where
the design also suggests the origin of the product.49
If a mark meets the above requirements and the Lanham Act does
42. See id. at 165. Further, the Court noted that it is a mark’s source-distinguishing ability
that allows it to serve the purposes of a trademark, not its ontological status. 514 U.S. at 164.
43. 709 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff in the case, WSM, operated the Opryland
U.S.A. amusement park and sold souvenir T-shirts bearing a design transfer mark describing
their “amusement park services.” Id. at 1085. Subsequently, the defendant began to sell T-shirts
and separate design transfers, adopting a design with the plaintiff’s mark. Id. at 1086.
44. 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
45. 709 F.2d at 1087. Specifically, the defendant characterized his use as “ornamental” or
“decorative,” invoking the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. Id.
46. Id.
47. 944 F.2d at 1237. Plaintiff designed and manufactured upscale sports cars, specifically
the Daytona Spyder and Testarossa. Id. At the time of the case, the Spyder, which plaintiff
manufactured from 1969-73, sold on the market for between one and two million dollars; while
a new Testarossa would sell for approximately $230,000. Id. at 1237-38. The defendant
manufactured fiberglass kits to attach to another vehicle that replicated the external shape of
plaintiff’s Spyder and Testarossa models and sold the kits for approximately $8,500. Id. at
1238.
48. 944 F.2d at 1239. See supra note 30 for a definition of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine.
49. Id. at 1247. The court cited WSM as authority for rejecting the broad application of
the aesthetic functionality doctrine. Id. The court stated that relating commercial desirability to
the functionality of a feature without regard to its utilitarian function discourages the
development of attractive designs because they would not be entitled to the same protection as
less appealing features. Id. at 1246.
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not directly bar protection,50 then the first user of the mark can
register it with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”).51 Registering the trademark allows the first user to
prevent others from appropriating it, provided the first user meets one
qualification: the first user must have used or intend to use the mark
in interstate commerce.52 Because trademark protection evolved from
the common law doctrine of unfair competition,53 the right to a mark
comes from “use in commerce” not mere adoption.54
While use in commerce mainly applies to application of the mark
to the owner’s principal products, the first user may also use a
trademark by adorning a collateral product with it.55 Businesses often
use collateral products for advertising purposes and distribute a large
variety of promotional products bearing their trademarks.56 This type
of trademark placement serves a dual purpose by increasing public
awareness of the trademark and product sales.57 A New York district
court recognized this type of advertising in Coca-Cola Co. v.
50. Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides certain exclusions from the marks eligible from
protection, for example, the United States flag. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1998).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
52. See  15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) for provision concerning actual use of mark. Under the
Lanham Act one uses a mark in commerce when it is affixed to the goods, their displays, or
documents associated with the goods if affixation is impractical and the goods are sold or
moved in commerce. Id. § 1127(1). On services, one uses a mark in commerce when it is used
or displayed in the advertising of the services, and the services are executed in commerce. Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) for provision concerning intended use.
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. The Lanham Act sections refer only to use in
commerce; however, § 45 defines “commerce” as “all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress.” Id. § 1127. Congress enacted the Lanham Act under the constitutional
authority of the Commerce Clause.
53. See GILSON, supra note 4.
54. Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines “use in commerce” as “a bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). See GILSON, supra note 4, § 3.02(4).
55. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 5.05(9). The COCA-COLA trademark has been officially
licensed to enhance all types of clothing, as well as jewelry, playing cards, glasses, and other
types of commonly used articles. Id.
56. See id. This type of trademark placement possibly evolved from the Pop Art
movement of the 1960s. Id. Led by Andy Warhol with his paintings of famous trademarks such
as COCA-COLA bottles and BRILLO soap pads, collateral products that were cheaper than the
artist’s originals began to appear. Id. The products that emerged, with adorning trademarks,
became popular, and while being utilitarian, they stimulated the sales of the trademark owner’s
staple products. Id.
57. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 5.05(9).
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Gemini.58 In Gemini the court noted that the alleged infringing
trademark use, a simulated bill poster, represented one common form
of advertising utilized by Coca-Cola.59 The court held that the
likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship of the poster could be
attributed to the plaintiff’s novelty advertising.60
Once first users establish an exclusive right in a trademark, they
can protect their mark from infringement by subsequent users, who
may confuse the public as to the source of the goods or services
provided.61 The Lanham Act specifically provides two main avenues
of protection for first users of marks in commerce. For federally
registered trademarks a person is liable for trademark infringement if
he uses a similar mark in commerce that is likely to cause confusion
among consumers without the consent of the registrant.62 Secondly,
the federal unfair competition statute provides a civil cause of action
against anyone who perpetuates a false designation of the origin of a
product or any false or misleading descriptions likely to cause
confusion in the marketplace.63
58. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The case centered on a poster distributed by the
defendant that parodied Coca-Cola’s trademark “Enjoy Coca-Cola” by replacing the “Cola”
with “ine” so the poster read “Enjoy Cocaine.” Id. at 1186.
59. 346 F. Supp. at 1188.
60. The court stated:
Not only does visual comparison of defendant’s poster with specimen advertising of
plaintiff indicate the likelihood of such a mistaken attribution but recent so-called “pop
art” novelty advertising utilized by plaintiff may have served to further the impression
that defendant’s poster was just another effort of that kind by plaintiff to publicize its
product.
Id. at 1189-90.
61. See supra note 22.
62. Specifically, liability exists when the subsequent user “use[s] in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”
15 U.S.C. Id. § 1114(1)(1).
63. The statute provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which:
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
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Two strikingly similar marks are more likely, but not certain, to
cause confusion.64 To infringe the mark of the first user, the
subsequent mark must be “confusingly similar.”65 Thus, courts do not
state the test for the likelihood of confusion merely in terms of the
marks themselves.66 The analysis must include the possibility that the
marks on the respective products, in their channels of trade, would
likely cause confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.67
Due to the imprecise, often subjective nature of the test, courts do not
state the test for the likelihood of confusion in a simple formula. For
this reason, courts employ a broad range of factors and conclude that
it is only able to resolve the likelihood of confusion on a fact specific
basis.68 In Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club,
by another person. . . .
Id. § 1125(a).
64. It is entirely possible for a mark almost identical, or even identical, to that of a
principle user not to infringe the trademark of the principle user. See GILSON, supra note 4,
§ 5.01(3)(c). Two identical marks can coexist without any confusion or likelihood of confusion
if they are on sufficiently different products or are on products in sufficiently different channels
of trade. See id. The use of an identical mark in commerce, however, can give rise to a cause of
action for “dilution” regardless of a likelihood of confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV
1998). Dilution entitles the owner of a famous mark to injunctive relief when another’s mark
weakens its distinctiveness. GILSON, supra note 4, § 5.01.
65. See GILSON, supra note 4, id. § 5.01(3)(c).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 5.01(3)(c)(i). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973), articulated one of the
most extensive lists of factors examined in deciding the likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) of
the Lanham Act. The court in E.I. du Pont listed the factors as follows:
(1) The Similarity Or Dissimilarity Of The Marks In Their Entireties As To      
Appearance, Sound, Connotation And Commercial Impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. “impulse”
vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent
use without evidence of actual confusion.
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Inc.,69 the Sixth Circuit delineated an eight-factor inquiry into
“likelihood of confusion.”70 The Sixth Circuit qualified the factor
inquiry, however, stating that the factors were only a guide in
determining whether confusion would likely result from concurrent
use of the two contested marks.71
III. TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR BUILDING DESIGNS AND
COMMENT ON COPYRIGHT IN BUILDING DESIGNS
The same legal principles underlying trade dress situations
generally apply to architectural features such as building designs.72
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, “family”
mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark:
(a) a mere “consent” to register or use.
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude
confusion, i.e. limitations on continued use of
the marks by each party.
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration
and good will of the related business.
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of
prior mark and indicative of lack of confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark
on its goods.
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
476 F.2d at 1361. Although the list of factors applied to discern the likelihood of confusion
under § 2(d), nothing in the Lanham Act suggests that the analysis under § 2(d) differs from
that under § 32(1). See GILSON, supra note 4, § 5.03(c)(ii). In addition, because the same
factors in deciding the likelihood of confusion under § 32(1) apply to § 43(a), one can presume
that the court uses the same factors that are used in § 2(d) cases also in § 43(a) cases. See id.
§ 7.02(7)(g).
69. 78 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1996).
70. See id. at 1116. For the factors listed by the court in determining “likelihood of
confusion,” see supra note 68.
71. See 78 F.3d at 1116 (citing Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir.
1988)). The court also specifically stated that the factors “imply no mathematical precision, and
a plaintiff need not show that all, or even most, of the factors listed are present in any particular
case to be successful.” Id.
72. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 7.02(7)(h)(i). In most cases, the architectural features are
service marks typically used by restaurants, hotels, dry cleaners, and other service oriented
businesses. Id.
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The theory of architectural features as service marks is based on
potential attraction of passing motorist to the business because of the
service mark.73 A unique service mark may make a lasting impression
on the consumer, making the business readily identifiable to them.74
The Sixth Circuit addressed building trademark issues as early as
1937, when the court decided White Tower System, Inc. v. White
Castle System of Eating Houses Corp.75 In White Tower, the plaintiff
and defendant both operated hamburger stands using a white
miniature castle in the same geographic area.76 The court found both
trademark rights and infringement existed. The court stated that it
will enjoin a subsequent user with an inimical building design,
seeking to gain from another’s established goodwill.77
Like other forms of trademarks and service marks, architectural
works are eligible for federal registration under the Lanham Act.78
The USPTO takes the position that “the three-dimensional
configuration of a building is able to be registered only if it is used in
such a way that it is or could be perceived as a mark.”79 Typically, for
registration with the USPTO, photographs of the building can serve
as proper specimens to illustrate the required use as a mark.80
The most obvious difficulty of applying trademark and service
mark protection to building designs occurs because of a building’s
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937).
76. Id. at 74. After the plaintiff’s filing of its complaint claiming unfair competition,
defendant cross-claimed for similar relief. Id. In addition to building styles, the plaintiff also
claimed unfair competition based on defendant’s business name and advertising slogan. Id.
Plaintiff’s business went by the name “White Tower” and used the slogan “Take Home a
Bagful,” while the defendant went by the name “White Castle” and used the slogan “Buy ‘Em
by the Sack.” Id. At trial the evidence showed that the plaintiff deliberately used the defendant’s
building design as a model for its own business design and even gave plans for the defendant’s
buildings to its architect. Id.
77. Id. at 70. The court previously defined “good will” as “the favorable consideration
shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source.” Id. at 69.
78. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 1301.02(c) (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter TMEP]. See also In re
Griffs of America, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 592 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
79. Id. § 1301.02(c).
80. See id. § 1301.02(c). The Patent and Trademark Office will accept evidence of a
building configuration’s use as a mark in the form of articles, such as menus, which show
promotion of the building’s configuration as a mark. Id.
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primary function as a shelter.81 Two different courts, in the Fotomat
Cases,82 analyzed the problem of functionality in relation to a drive-
thru photo developing business’ kiosk design.83 In Fotomat I a New
Jersey district court stated that trademark protection only existed for
building design elements that are distinctive, nonfunctional, or
arbitrary.84 In Fotomat II a Kansas district court found that the
plaintiff’s overall building design, the same design as in Fotomat I,
could serve as a valid trademark.85 The court held that, while a
building design might have some functional elements, it could still be
protected if the design was not “in essence” functional.86
Trademark infringement of an architectural trademark, like other
forms of infringement, requires the existence of a likelihood of
confusion. Courts deciding architectural element trademark cases, as
in other trademarks cases, determine the likelihood of confusion on a
fact specific basis, employing a series of factors.87
81. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 7.02(7)(h)(iii).
82. Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc. (Fotomat I), 425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977);
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran (Fotomat II), 437 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Kan. 1977). Both cases dealt
with the building design of Fotomat’s photographic service business, which it had previously
registered as a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
83. The term kiosk applies to small structures with one or more open sides. WEBSTER
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 663 (1983).
84. 425 F. Supp. at 706. The court found that no public interest exists for preserving
within the public domain unique or arbitrary aspects of building design. Id. However, while the
court stated that nonfunctional aspects of building designs could serve as trademarks, the court
held that the plaintiff’s kiosk was primarily functional. Id. at 707. The court found that the
nonfunctional, protectable elements of the plaintiff’s kiosk were not confusingly similar to the
defendant’s structure and thus no infringement existed. Id.
85. 437 F. Supp. at 1245. The court noted that the Fotomat I case reached a contrary
conclusion as to the functionality issue of plaintiff’s kiosk. Id. at 1235. The court distinguished
the case by noting that the New Jersey court received no specific evidence on the issue of
functionality, whereas the plaintiff in this case provided evidence clearly indicating the building
design was only incidentally functional. Id. at 1236.
86. Id. at 1235. The court stated:
. . . some articles, made in a purely arbitrary configuration, (e.g., the wine bottle
considered in Mogen David [Application of Mogen David Wine Corporation, 51
C.C.P.A. 1260, 328 F.2d 925 (1964)] may perform a function, holding wine, which
could equally well be served by containers of many other shapes, and in such
circumstances the incidental function should not by itself preclude trademark
registrability if the other conditions precedent are present.
Id. (quoting Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Corp., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
87. See GILSON, supra note 4, § 7.02(7)(h)(iv). Some of those factors used by many courts
include: whether the alleged infringer designed the mark independently, without knowledge of
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As mentioned in the introduction, traditional building trademark
protection lawsuits focus on potential infringers creating similar
building designs. Recently, along with Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in
the Sixth Circuit, a New York district court dealt with trademark
infringement of a three-dimensional structure alleged against a
producer of souvenir merchandise. In New York Racing Association,
Inc. v. Perlmutter Publishing, Inc.,88 the court held that T-shirts
depicting paintings of horse racing scenes at the Saratoga Race
Course did not infringe the Course’s trade dress.89 The court stated
that in order to afford an aesthetic product feature trade dress
protection absent secondary meaning, it must be “inherently
distinctive” when copied onto souvenir merchandise.90 The court
found that determining whether a product feature qualifies as
“inherently distinctive” requires an inquiry into whether the feature is
likely to serve primarily as an indicator of source.91
Comment on Copyright as it Applies to Architecture
Intellectual property protection for architecture includes not only
trademark and trade dress protection, but also, copyright protection.92
the principle’s mark; whether possible intentional appropriation can raise a likelihood of
confusion inference; whether the plaintiff’s design is so functional as to make it unprotectable
as a trademark; whether the architectural feature serves as a trademark or service mark; or
whether likelihood of confusion is likely because of similarity between the two marks. Id.
88. 959 F. Supp. 578 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
89. Id. at 581. The plaintiff in the case operated the Saratoga Race Course and sold
souvenir merchandise depicting racing scenes from the course. Id. The asserted trade dress
claim in the case centered on the grandstand, which the plaintiff claimed to be one of the most
recognizable structures in horse racing (second only to the twin spires at Churchill Downs) and
a valuable source of licensing revenue. Id.
90. The court defined the aesthetic product feature as the images of the Saratoga Race
Course depicted on souvenir items such as T-shirts. Id.
91. Id. at 580 (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 1005 (2d Cir.
1995)). Basing its decision on this test, the court found the evidence insufficient to conclude
that the images of the race course on plaintiff’s merchandise served primarily as an indicator of
source. Id. at 581.
92. In the United States, protection of an author’s work under copyright begins with the
Constitution, which authorizes the granting of exclusive rights to authors for their works. See
supra note 12. Under this authority, in 1790 Congress enacted the first copyright act. See
MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT  § 1.01 (1998). From that first
copyright act, copyright law would undergo two major changes in the next two hundred years,
ending with the 1976 Copyright Act. Congress overhauled the 1790 copyright act in 1909; and
again in 1976, resulting in, for the most part, current copyright law as it stands today. See
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Copyright protection for architectural works evolved through a
different form, and only recently came into its own as a distinct
category of copyrightable subject matter.
Originally, works of architecture under federal copyright law fell
into the category of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”93 As
such, works of architecture were subject to the “useful article
doctrine,”94 and accompanying separability test95 that governed the
copyrightability of works within that category.96 In 1988 the United
States ratified the Berne Convention,97 which required the United
States to comply with the minimum standards of copyright protection
of the Convention.98 Assessing the requirements of the Berne
Convention, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that Article
2(1) of the treaty included “works of architecture” among articles
protected by copyright.99
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 323
(1997).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Under the 1976 Copyright Act pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works include: “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and
applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models,
and technical drawings, including architectural plans.” MERGES ET AL., supra note 92, at 323
(emphasis added).
94. See id. The useful article doctrine provides that the copyrightability of pictorial,
geographic, and sculptural works include only those “works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.” Id.
95. See id. The separability test provides that:
The design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
Id.
96. See NIMMER, supra note 92, § 2.08(D)(2)(a), n.159.
97. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 1, 102 Stat.
2853. The Berne Convention grew from the Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, which was signed in Berne, Switzerland, in 1886. See NIMMER, supra note 92,
§ 17.01(B)(1). The subject of the Convention was recognition of copyright protection across
international boundaries. Since its inception 77 countries have adopted the Berne Convention.
See id.
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 5-6 (1990), at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935.
99. See id. at 11. Specifically, Article 2(1) provides protection for three-dimensional
works of architecture, separate from illustrations, sketches, plans, and three-dimensional works
that relate to architecture. See NIMMER, supra note 92, § 2.20. Because of the discrepancy
between then current copyright law and the Berne Convention with respect to works of
architecture, the Senate Judiciary Committee requested an in-depth study from the Copyright
Office, in order to evaluate how the level of copyright protection afforded architecture could be
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In 1990 as a result of the Copyright Office’s report on the subject,
Congress enacted the Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act100 in order to fully comply with the Berne Convention.101 Among
other provisions, the Act added a new separate category of
copyrightable subject matter, “architectural works,” to the Copyright
Act.102
In addition to adding architectural works as a separate
copyrightable subject, the Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act added a provision to the Copyright Act on the scope of
architectural copyright rights.103 This section of the Copyright Act
allows two exceptions to exclusive rights for architectural works:
permitting certain pictorial representations of architecturial works
and allowing owners to alter or destroy the building’s physical
structure.104 The House Committee recognized the public art form of
architecture and that millions of people visit different cities every
year and return home with photographs, posters, and other pictorial
depictions of famous works of architecture as mementos of their
raised to the required level of Berne. Id. See generally Notice of Inquiry: Works of
Architecture, 53 Fed. Reg. 21536 (1998).
100. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990).
101. See NIMMER, supra note 92, § 2.20.
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (1990). The Copyright Act defines “architectural work” as
“the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a
building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include
individual standard features.” Id. § 101. Separating out architectural works from pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works meant that architectural works were not subject to the separability
test of the useful article doctrine like pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. See NIMMER,
supra note 92, § 2.20. For a discussion of the separability test see supra note 94. While
architectural works are no longer subject to the separability test, they are still subject to a
functionality requirement, allowing protection only when “the design elements are not
functionally required.” See NIMMER, supra note 92, § 2.20.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 120 (1990).
104. The statute provides:
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the
right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings,
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the
work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.
17 U.S.C. § 120(a).The statute states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(2), the
owners of a building embodying an architectural work may, without the consent of the author or
copyright owner of the architectural work, make or authorize the making of alterations to such
building, and destroy or authorize the destruction of such building.” Id. § 120(b).
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trips.105 By allowing pictorial representations of architecture,
Congress sought to balance the interests of authors and the public.106
IV. ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM V. GENTILE
PRODUCTIONS
A. A Photographer Creates a Poster of the Rock and Roll
Hall of Fame
In 1991 the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame Foundation
(“Foundation”) commissioned famous architect I.M. Pei to design a
building to house the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame Museum
(“Museum”).107 The Foundation opened the doors to the Museum in
1995.108 In 1996 the Foundation received approval from the State of
Ohio for trademark and servicemark registration of the Museum’s
building design.109 Since before the Museum’s opening the
Foundation sold various promotional items featuring the Museum’s
building design, including a poster.110 Also, many of these
promotional items depicted a small insignia or trademark.111
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22. In addition, Congress also noted that many
scholarly works on architecture rely on photographs of architectural works. Id.
106. See id. Remarking that pictorial representations do not hinder the normal exploitation
of architectural works, the Committee decided that the intervening public policy justified the
exception to copyright’s exclusive rights. Id. The Committee stated that, without the express
exception, a defense of fair use could be raised by an alleged infringer who photographed a
work of architecture; however, they stated that the exception was inserted to prevent the ad hoc
decisions of the fair use defense. Id.
107. 134 F.3d at 750. The Foundation envisioned a building embodying the “freedom,
youthful energy, rebellion, and movement of rock and roll music.” Id. at 751. Before
constructing the Museum in 1988, the Foundation registered as its service mark “THE ROCK
AND ROLL HALL OF FAME” with the USPTO. Id. at 750.
108. Id. at 750.
109. 134 F.3d at 751. The Foundation currently has a pending trademark application with
the USPTO regarding the Museum’s building design. Id.
110. As early as 1993 the Foundation sold promotional materials such as T-shirts and
posters depicting versions of the building’s shape. Id. at 759 (Martin, Jr., CJ, dissenting). The
poster of the Museum features the building on opening night, from a distant, elevated vantage
point, with a red carpet scrolling down from the building’s front doors and interior lights
illuminating the Museum’s glass facade. Id. at 752. Beneath the photograph of the Museum
appears the words, “The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum— Cleveland.” Id.
111. 134 F.3d at 752. The court labeled the trademark as the “composite mark,” and
described it as:
a triangle formed by six lines fanning out from a single point. The triangle is
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Around the spring of 1996, professional photographer Charles
Gentile photographed the building for use on a poster featuring the
Museum.112 The Foundation sent Gentile a letter warning him of the
trademark violation liability he would incur if he sold the poster
without the Foundation’s approval.113 Despite these warnings Gentile
began selling a poster of the photograph that spring.114
B. The Foundation Files Suit and Receives a Preliminary Injunction
After Gentile offered his poster depicting the Museum building
for sale, the Foundation filed a five-count complaint alleging
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark
dilution.115 The Foundation then filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Gentile from distributing the posters of the
Museum, pending the outcome of a trial.116
At the hearing on the Foundation’s motion, the district court found
intersected by three horizontal lines, contains two dots running vertically, and may be
intended to be evocative of the Museum’s building design. In a circle around this
triangular design are the words, “ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME &
MUSEUM.”
Id. The other items produced by the Foundation at trial, including an advertisement for the
Museum’s opening, some postcards, and two T-shirts. Id. The advertisement and the two T-
shirts also featured the composite mark. Id.
112. Gentile approached the Foundation about obtaining official sponsorship for a poster of
his photograph, but the Foundation rejected his offer. 934 F. Supp. 868, 871 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
113. Id.
114. 134 F.3d at 751. Gentile’s photograph featured a close-up of the Museum at ground
level, apparently taken at a time when the Museum was closed. Id. at 752. The poster contained
the photograph with an inscription underneath that read, “ROCK ‘N ROLL HALL OF FAME,”
which appeared above the smaller word, “CLEVELAND.” Id. at 751. Gentile’s signature
appears in small print below the photograph, as does a copyright notice from Gentile
Productions, also in small print. Id.
115. 134 F.3d at 751. Specifically, the Foundation alleged trademark infringement in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), “unfair competition, false or misleading representations, and
false designation of origin” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and dilution of trademarks under
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Id.
The Foundation brought two other counts under Ohio law, claiming unfair competition and
trademark infringement. Id. The court did not analyze the Foundation’s state law claims
separately from the federal claims and stated that the analysis of Ohio state statutory and
common law trademark infringement claims follows the federal Lanham Act. 934 F. Supp. at
872 (citing Yocono’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Yocono, 651 N.E.2d 1347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)).
116. 134 F.3d at 751. Because the Foundation based its motion only on its trademark
infringement claim, the district court instructed Gentile that he did not need to respond to the
entire complaint for the preliminary injunction hearing. Id.
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the Museum’s design fanciful and capable of trademark protection.117
In addition, the court noted that it could infer an intent to deceive the
public as to origin when the defendant uses an identical mark.118 The
district court granted the Foundation’s motion, concluding that it met
the burden required to issue a preliminary injunction.119
C. Gentile Appeals Preliminary Injunction
Gentile appealed the preliminary injunction to the Sixth Circuit,
claiming that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
injunction.120 A split court of appeals vacated the preliminary
injunction, concluding that the record did not establish that the
Foundation had a likelihood of success on the merits.121 The majority
based its decision on a finding that Gentile’s photograph did not
infringe on the Museum’s building design trademark.122
Conceding that a photograph prominently depicting another’s
trademark could use the trademark as the object of the photograph,
117. 934 F. Supp. at 872. The court noted that a fanciful mark is the strongest of
characterized trademarks; therefore, it was more likely that encroachment would cause
confusion. Id. Further, the court stated that extensive advertising and promotion of the
Museum’s building design trademarks created public recognition of the trademarks as being
connected with the Museum either through the Foundation, its official licensees, or its official
sponsors. 134 F.3d at 752.
118. 934 F. Supp. at 872. The district court stated that to prove trademark infringement the
Foundation must show that (1) it has a protectable trademark and (2) confusion is likely to
result from the unauthorized use of the trademark. Id. at 871 (citing Sadler-Cisar, Inc. v.
Commercial Sales Network, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 (N.D. Ohio 1991)).
119. 934 F. Supp. at 873. In considering the Foundation’s motion for preliminary
injunction, the district court relied on four factors: (1) reasonable probability of plaintiff’s
success on the merits of its claim(s), (2) irreparable injury to plaintiff if relief is not granted, (3)
probability of substantial harm to others if the injunction is granted, and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by granting the preliminary injunction. Id. at 871 (citing Frisch’s
Restaurant Inc. v. Shoney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir. 1985)). The district court’s
preliminary injunction ordered Gentile to cease the making, selling, and using of his poster
depicting the Museum and to deliver to the Foundation’s attorney all of the posters in his
possession for destruction. Id. at 873.
120. 134 F.3d at 753. Specifically, Gentile argued that his photograph of the Museum and
use of the words “ROCK N’ ROLL HALL OF FAME” were not infringing trademark uses of
the Museum’s building design and servicemark. Id. Gentile argued that the words “ROCK N’
ROLL HALL OF FAME” serve the non-trademark purpose of merely describing his non-
infringing photograph. Id.
121. Id.
122. 134 F.3d at 755.
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the majority was not persuaded that the Foundation used the
Museum’s design as a trademark.123 First, the court asserted that they
did not readily recognize the Museum’s design as an indicator of
origin or sponsorship; rather, they viewed the photograph as that of a
well-known and accessible public landmark.124 The majority stated
that the public might not perceive a picture of the Museum as an
identifier or origin as much as ornamentation.125 Second, the majority
found that the Foundation’s use of various building depictions on its
merchandise weakened its claimed use as a trademark.126 The
majority reasoned that the hallmark of a trademark was consistent
and repetitive use of a mark as an indicator of origin; a use the
Foundation failed to implement with respect to the Museum.127
Next, the majority turned to Gentile’s use of the words “ROCK N’
ROLL HALL OF FAME - CLEVELAND” and the Museum’s
registered service mark of the same.128 Without making a conclusion
as to the possible infringement, the majority found it highly probable
that Gentile’s use would constitute non-infringing fair use of the
123. Id. at 754.
124. Id. Contradicting the district court’s finding that the public had come to recognize
pictures of the Museum’s design as being associated with the Foundation, the majority also
noted the that the record lacked any evidence that the public recognized the Museum’s design
as a trademark. Id. Further, the majority claimed that the Museum’s designation as a landmark
in downtown Cleveland undercuts a finding of “fancifulness” in a trademark context. Id.
125. Id. at 754-55.
126. Id. at 755. The merchandise depicting the Museum used different versions of the
building shape on different souvenirs. Some items featured the rear of the building, and
drawings of the building on two T-shirts differed from the photograph on the poster. Id. Also,
while one postcard contains the same photograph as the poster, another postcard shows close-up
photographs of the Museum, which the court claimed are not immediately recognizable as the
Museum. Id.
127. 134 F.3d at 755. The majority likened this case to cases where the estates of deceased
celebrities tried to claim trademark protection of the famous person’s likeness. Id. The majority
cited one case dealing with the likeness of Elvis Presley where a New Jersey District Court held
that even if Presley’s Estate could show that one particular image of Presley had been used
consistently as a trademark, that did not support the conclusion that all images of Presley served
the same function. Id. (citing Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1363-64 (D.N.J.
1981)). The court also cited a case holding that even if Babe Ruth had an established trademark
in one particular representation of his likeness, that trademark would not cover all photographs
ever taken of Ruth. 134 F.3d at 755 (citing Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1990)).
128. The majority noted that the district court did not make a separate finding with respect
to the words alone, and thus, the majority could not be certain how the district court would have
ruled had the photograph been found non-infringing. 134 F.3d at 756.
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Foundation’s mark.129 The majority stated that if the Foundation fails
to show that Gentile made an infringing use of the Museum design,
then Gentile’s use of the words would merely constitute a description
of his good.130
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Martin Jr. stated that the
Foundation had established a trademark in the Museum design.131
The dissent noted that the Museum’s design serves to identify it to
consumers and as an array of tangible and intangible elements.132 The
totality of the contents of the Museum is the goods of the Foundation,
of which posters are but a singular part.133 Responding to the
majority’s claim that, in Gentile’s poster, the Museum appears to be
the good itself, the dissent concluded if that were true, the Foundation
sells buildings, and Gentile sells photographs of buildings.134
Addressing the Foundation’s trademark use of the Museum, the
dissent noted that versions of the Museum’s shape were in use on a
variety of products more than two years before the actual
construction of the building, before the Museum even became a
landmark.135 The dissent claimed that before the construction of the
Museum, the promotional materials, bearing the versions of the
Museum, represented the Foundation’s goods and established a
trademark.136 The dissent rhetorically asked whether a Coca-Cola
129. Id. at 756. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1998) allows a party to defend a trademark
infringement claim on the grounds that the use of the term is “descriptive of and used fairly and
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party.” Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (Martin, Jr., CJ, dissenting). “I believe that the Museum has devised a
distinguishable token, appropriated that token to a particular class of goods and plainly
demonstrated quantifiable good will.” Id.
132. Id. at 757. The dissent likened the Museum to a Coca-Cola bottle, which serves to
both allow the consumer to identify the contents of the bottle and to contain the Coca-Cola soft
drink. Id. As the Museum building represented the Coca-Cola bottle, the dissent noted that the
Museum’s contents represented the Coca-Cola drink inside the bottle. Id.
133. 134 F.3d at 757 (Martin, Jr., CJ, dissenting). The Museum, the dissent noted, houses
nostalgia, memorabilia, and a bazaar that sells snow domes, postcards, T-shirts, baseball hats,
and posters. Id. With respect to the poster at the center of the litigation, the dissent claimed,
“[i]f a photograph of a trademark . . . can be sold by the owner of the trademark in a poster
form, that poster naturally must be recognized as one of the owner’s ‘goods’, albeit a derivative
good.” Id.
134. Id. at 757-58.
135. Id. at 759. “Such use predates the opening of the Museum by more than two years; the
Museum would have then been not a public landmark, but a construction project.” Id.
136. 134 F.3d at 759. The Foundation’s promotional items “announced to the public the
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bottle would enjoy any less trademark protection if it were ten stories
tall.137 In addition, a photograph of the bottle would still be a
photograph of a trademark, entitling the Coca-Cola Company to
protect it as such.138
Turning to the doctrine of functionality, the dissent observed that
if the Museum housed its artifacts in a warehouse, the building design
would be insufficient to claim trademark protection, since purely
functional designs cannot serve as trademarks.139 Instead, the
Foundation created a signature edifice so unique that it offers instant
recognizability.140
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority’s distinction between
the trademark fancifulness of the Museum and the word “Exxon”;
while a distinction might be accurate, the dissent stated it is
nonetheless irrelevant, since the Lanham Act read literally has been
held nonrestrictive.141 The dissent claimed that no meaningful
distinction exists between a two-dimensional and three-dimensional
trademark; therefore, a photograph of the Museum could qualify as a
trademark on merchandise.142
coming of a place where not only could they measure their own lives by the evolution of rock
music, they could also buy more promotional material to show for their visits.” Id.
137. Id. Also, the Foundation’s five Ohio state trademark and two Ohio state service marks
registrations describe the mark as being either the “Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum
Building,” or “Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum Building Shape.” The dissent noted
these registrations and stated they were not inconsistent with using different versions of the
Museum shape on products. Id..
138. Id. Moreover, the dissent claimed if a particular photograph of the bottle were not
recognizable as the Coca-Cola bottle, the trademark of the bottle itself would not be impaired.
Id. Additionally, a likelihood of confusion would be absent since the photograph could not be
discerned as one of the trademark. Id.
139. Id. at 757 (citing WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir.
1983)).
140. 134 F.3d at 757.
141. Id. at 759. The dissent cited the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prodnet Co., Inc., which upheld the ability of a mark to serve as a valid trademark
even though it had a functional use as well as an origin identifying use. Id. See supra notes 39-
42 and accompanying text.
142. 134 F.3d at 759 (Martin, Jr., CJ, dissenting).
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V. ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME: VALID TRADEMARK?143
In vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction, the court of
appeals relied on two bases: the validity of the Foundation’s
trademark and Gentile’s use of the photograph. While the majority
may have been correct in vacating the injunction, their analysis
confuses two issues: the validity of the trademark and the likelihood
of confusion.144
The finding that the Foundation had not used the Museum design
as a trademark was the most thoroughly analyzed basis for the
majority’s decision.145 The majority’s rationale presents the first
major problem with the opinion. Throughout the majority’s opinion
they discuss the Museum’s non-trademark uses; however, they base
their conclusions on the pictures of the Museum, not the building
itself.146 Even if the Foundation had not used pictures of the Museum
for a trademark purpose, that fact does not lead to the conclusion that
the Foundation had not used the building itself as a trademark. The
White Tower and Fotomat decisions demonstrate the appropriateness
of buildings as trademarks.147 Furthermore, the USPTO registers
buildings as trademarks if they are used such that they could be
recognized as a mark; advertisements are considered evidence of
such use.148 The dissent correctly points out that the promotional
materials featuring the Museum’s design are the goods that establish
the trademark in the Museum design.149 Because the use of such
collateral products increases public awareness of the Museum, this
143. An important preliminary fact of consideration concerning Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame is that the decision of the Sixth Circuit only vacated the district court’s preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for further consideration. This leaves open the possibility that
a fact finder, with the benefit of a trial, may conclude that Gentile made a trademark infringing
use of the Museum’s valid trademark. The effect of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion only serves to
create doubt as to the validity of the Museum’s claim of trademark infringement.
144. While the majority based their decision on the Foundation’s trademark and Gentile’s
alleged infringment, they never directly addressed the likelihood of confusion issue.
145. 134 F.3d at 754.
146. Id. The majority states that while the Museum’s design is fanciful, it is not clear that a
picture of the Museum is fanciful as would define a trademark. Id. at 154-55. The majority
concludes that the Foundation has not used the Museum design on its goods with any
consistency, the hallmark of a trademark. Id. at 155.
147. See supra notes 75-77, 82-86 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
149. 134 F.3d at 759 (Martin, Jr., CJ, dissenting).
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merchandise serves an advertising purpose.150
The majority’s statement that the Museum’s existence as a
landmark undercuts its fancifulness as a trademark is also incorrect;
the majority seems to apply an aesthetic functionality bar against the
Museum.151 The majority’s argument suggests that if the Foundation
had constructed a less memorable building to house the Museum,
then the weakened status of the Museum as a landmark would have
increased the available trademark protection.152 This argument
contradicts the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Ferrari.153 The court in
Ferrari refused to apply such a broad application of the aesthetic
functionality doctrine, because it would discourage the development
of attractive designs.154 Furthermore, the Museum’s recognizability
and its association with services provided therein fully comport with
the theory behind architectural trademarks. The Museum’s unique
building design and landmark status will draw passing motorists to
the Museum. The Museum’s design will make the Foundation’s
services and products readily identifiable to the public.155
In contrast to the majority, the dissent focused on the Museum
design as a three-dimensional trademark. The dissent correctly points
out that the Museum’s physical structure serves as the trademark, and
that the photograph of the Museum merely depicts the three-
dimensional, trademarked structure.156 The dissent makes a
convincing argument that the Foundation owns a valid trademark in
150. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
151. 134 F.3d 754. Their argument seems to be that the Museum gains its appeal by
recognition as a public landmark, and this recognition undermines the ability of the Museum
design to designate a source of origin for its products and services.
152. The dissent directly addresses the majority’s suggestion by noting that had the
Foundation “sought only an attic to in which to store its artifacts, it might have leased a
warehouse with substantially more space at a fraction of the cost.” 134 F.3d at 757.
153. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobile Corse, 944 F.2d at 1235. See supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
154. 944 F.2d at 1246.
155. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. The dissent also correctly noted that
the Museum’s landmark quality is due to the Foundation’s desire that the building serve as a
mark by constructing a structure so unique that it offered instant recognizability. 134 F.3d at
757.
156. Id. at 758. The dissent’s analogy involved the Coke bottle and a photograph of it. Id.
The dissent noted that: “When a Coke bottle is photographed it loses its dimension, but the
subject of the picture remains recognizable as one of a trademarked, three dimensional figure.”
Id.
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the Museum’s design; however, he failed to discuss the likelihood of
confusion requirement of trademark infringement.157
Although the majority based its decision on the lack of a valid
trademark in the Museum, if analyzed in terms of the likelihood of
confusion requirement, it leads to the correct conclusion.158 First, one
of the factors for determining the likelihood of confusion requires
comparing the two conflicting marks in their entirety.159 As the
majority noted, the Foundation used a composite mark on most of the
promotional items that displayed the Museum.160 This composite
mark and the depiction of the Museum constitute the totality of the
sponsorship identifying mark on the promotional items to form the
complete commercial impression. Removing one element, namely the
composite mark, would change the commercial impression of the
item and create an overall appearance less likely to cause confusion
with a product bearing both elements.161
Second, while the majority incorrectly equated the various
photographic versions of the Museum with an unestablished
trademark use, this fact also illustrates a relevant point with respect to
the likelihood of confusion. Logically, the greater the number of
photographic versions of the Museum, the more diluted the source
identifying function of the Museum design.162 The fact that these
157. The dissent seems to believe that likelihood of confusion simply exists if two marks
are duplicates, and directly compete with one another in similar channels of commerce. 134
F.3d at 758. These characteristics of competing marks are certainly factors in determining the
likelihood of confusion, but as the Sixth Circuit previously stated in Champions Golf Club, Inc.
v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1996), the test for likelihood of
confusion cannot be stated with mathematical precision.
158. This assumes that the Foundation had established a valid trademark in the Museum
design. Also, because the photographic promotional material of the Museum establish its
trademark right, these photographs must be the basis of any likelihood of confusion arising out
of Gentile’s photograph.
159. See supra note 70; Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d at 1116.
160. 134 F.3d at 752. The composite mark appears on the Foundation’s poster of the
Museum as well as the T-shirts and advertisements bearing the Museum. Id. The majority
described the composite mark as “a small circular designation” appearing to be a trademark. Id.
161. See supra note 68 (factor (1)).
162. The majority noted that the numerous versions of the Museum do not “create a
consistent and distinct commercial impression as an indicator of a single source of origin or
sponsorship.” 134 F.3d at 755. In this case the only version of any practical importance to the
issue of sponsorship should be Gentile’s version; the majority’s analysis, nonetheless, illustrates
the point.
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numerous versions exist makes it less likely that any one photograph
indicates a single source of origin or sponsorship over any other.163 If
the Foundation retained sole ownership rights to every photograph of
the Museum design, then diluting the source identifying function of
the design would be irrelevant; however, they hold no such right.164
Photographs of the Museum have appeared complementing articles in
newspapers and magazines throughout the Museum’s existence.165
The widespread photographing of the Museum suggests another
reason the likelihood of confusion requirement should fail in Rock
and Roll Hall of Fame. This photographing illustrates the principle
difficulty with providing building designs with broad protection
against many types of photography. Photographs of our surrounding
environment appear in many places throughout our society: from
souvenirs and replications to newsprint and movies.166 For this
reason, it becomes difficult to attach an origin or sponsorship
identifying function to the photograph of a building.167 The owner of
163. See supra note 126.
164. The majority noted that “[t]here is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.” 134 F.3d at 753 (quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,
97 (1918)). Addressing the property right in photographs of the Museum, the dissent stated that,
“[m]erely selling a poster of its own trademark does not give the [Foundation] the right to
enjoin every duplication of its mark.” 134 F.3d at 758.
165. For examples of articles accompanied by photographs of the Museum see Herbert
Muschamp, Architecture ‘95: Challenging The All-Too Rational, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995,
§ 2, at 38; and Karen D. Stein, Cleveland Rocks, ARCHITECTURAL RECORD, Nov. 30, 1995, at
82; David Dillon, Classic Pei a Little Off-key in Rock Milieu, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept.
10, 1995, at 1C.
166. Souvenirs from tourist attractions frequently depict the public environment of that
attraction. For example, Fishs Eddy, a tableware store in New York, sells a series of souvenir
dishes depicting a New York skyline border with the Chrysler Building and other landmarks
featured. David W. Dunlap, Design Notebook: The Skyline: Next a Fee for Looking?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1998, at F1. For examples of newsprint featuring photographs specifically of
the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame building, see supra note 165.
Similarly, comporting with the theme of the casino, the New York-New York Hotel and
Casino of Las Vegas constructed a scale facade of numerous New York landmarks, including
the New York Stock Exchange. Dunlap, supra. Also, frequently buildings appear in television
and movies, giving a realistic viewpoint to the motion picture. For example, the movie
“Godzilla” featured the mythical creature crushing the Flatiron Building, as well as many other
New York landmarks. Id.
167. As part of Gentile’s defense, he introduced an illustration of the Cleveland skyline,
which included the Museum and its surrounding buildings. 134 F.3d at 754. Gentile also
introduced a quilt featuring the landmarks of Cleveland, which included the Museum. Id. The
majority in Rock and Roll Hall of Fame noted that the illustration and quilt presented by Gentile
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the trademarked building could claim that no trademark problem
exists when the building appears among several others in a
photograph or illustration.168 The problem would be where to draw
the line between non-infringing skyline illustrations and infringing
singular building illustrations.169 The prevalence of photographic
images of our surroundings makes it unlikely that the public would
associate the majority of building photographs with the owner of the
building’s trademark.
When they amended the Copyright Act in 1990, Congress
addressed the issue of grand scale photographing of buildings and the
problems associated with blocking such photographs from the
public.170 In this Act Congress provided an exception to the copyright
in architecture by allowing pictorial representations of publicly
visible works of architecture.171 Congressional recognition of
building photographs in the public domain comes from the legislative
history; where Congress noted the prevalence of vacation mementos
consisting of photos of famous works of architecture created by a
large number of originators.172 This illustrates the point that it is
unlikely the public will associate a building photograph with one
particular originator or sponsor, even if the photograph features a
single building.
While most photographs of buildings are not likely to confuse the
public as to origin or sponsorship, that does not mean that confusion
will never occur in the case of a photographic representation of a
building trademark. For example, while Fotomat II centered on a
confusingly similar building design, the court addressed the
would present an easier case for finding non-infringement. Id.
168. In Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, the Foundation specifically responded to Gentile’s
exhibits, supra note 166, by stating that such illustrations would not present a trademark
problem. 134 F.3d at 754.
169. To draw the line between illustrations, the essential question becomes: “How many
buildings does it take for a photograph to not indicate origin or sponsorship from a specific
building’s trademark holder?”
170. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying
text.
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(a).
172. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22. Also, while the argument exists that trademark law
operates on different standards than copyright law, the Copyright Act represents evidence that
Congress favors the right of the public to photograph freely public buildings.
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photographic representation of the building.173 The court found that
the two-dimensional representations of the buildings used in
advertising and other printed material caused confusion as to
origin.174
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit in Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, while ending
their opinion with the correct conclusion, actually confuses the two
issues of establishing a valid trademark and the likelihood of
confusion between two trademarks. The Foundation clearly
established a valid trademark right in the design of the Museum.175
Had the court directly addressed the likelihood of confusion
requirement, however, it would have failed to establish the
Foundation’s likelihood of success on the merits as required for a
preliminary injunction.
One basis for the failure of the likelihood of confusion, the
multitude of existing photographs, generally applies to the majority
of buildings. While buildings may undeniably enjoy a level of
trademark protection, this basis provides a rationale for thin
protection for pictorial reproductions of building trademarks in many
cases. The trademark holder of a building may enjoin certain
reproductions of their trademark; however, the holder must first
establish that a likelihood of confusion exists with concurrent use of
the holder’s mark and the alleged infringing mark.
173. Fotomat Corp., 437 F. Supp. at 1231. See supra notes 35-86 and accompanying text.
174. “In addition to the confusing similarity between plaintiff’s and defendant’s buildings,
there is confusion caused by the similarity in the two-dimensional representations of the
buildings used by the parties on their advertising, fliers, processing envelopes, and other printed
material.” Id. at 1241.
175. The Foundation satisfied the requirements of establishing a trademark in the Museum
by designing an inherently distinctive building and using the building design on promotional
materials. See supra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
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